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At Issue

First Amendment
What content restrictions can Congress place on NEA grants?
New York artist Karen Finley became
briefly famous last year as the recipient of a
National Endowment for the Humanities grant
for work that includes smearing her nude body
with chocolate and uttering statements like "God
is death."
Enough, say conservatives, who believe the
government has no business subsidizing what
they consider offensive art. Former Assistant

Attorney General William Bradford Reynolds is
more moderate, arguing that Congress can
impose restrictions on NEA funding, but only
subject to constitutional limits.
The real problem, says Rodney A Smolla, a
law professor at the College of William and Mary,
is knowing where to stop. Smolla fears a chilling
effect could result from legislators acting as art
critics.

A Hot Potato for Congress
BY WILLIAM BRADFORD
REYNOLDS
As we move this year into a new
round ofbudget talks, the debate on
federal appropriations to fund artists whose work some consider indecent is bound to resurface.
With a daunting deficit gap,
billions needed to pay for the Desert
Storm operation, an S&L bailout
fiasco that grows worse by the
minute, and sympathy apparently
building on the Hill to subsidize the
D.C. government to the tune of some
$100 million, we can expect some to
question whether the National Endowment for the Humanities should
receive any federal dollars this year.
Mter all, creative artistry has
never been know to spring from
federal subsidies; nor has it been
stifled by the lack of government
largesse. Moreover, defunding NEA
altogether raises no First Amendment concerns.
Nonetheless, a total cut-off of
federal funds seems unlikely. Congress probably will vote to continue
a government subsidy for the arts,
but in a reduced amount.
That, too, presents no First
Amendment difficulties, as seems
clear from the Supreme Court's
decision not long ago in Regan v.
Taxation Without Representation,
461 U.S. 540 (1983).
Such a funding reduction will
mean that some NEA grants cannot
be renewed. Even so, the termi36 ABA JOURNAL/ JUNE 1991

nated recipients remain free to express themselves artistically, every
bit as uninhibited by government
regulations as those artists who
never received an NEA subsidy.
I st Amendment Boundaries

This does not suggest that the
NEA can be wholly indifferent to
the First Amendment. A grant of
federal money made to advance one
religious belief over others would
likely run afoul of the establishment
clause,just as an NEA award driven
by an overt hostility to a particular
religion introduces similar constitutional problems under the free exercise clause.
While the funding of artwork
that portrays offensively prejudicial
messages reflecting racial or religious bias has free speech protection,
openly discriminatory award decisions bottomed on race, gender or
ethnic background are constitutionally suspect.
To refine constitutional guidelines even further, Congress confidently can direct the NEA not to use
any of its grant money to fund
"obscene" art so long as it makes
clear that the obscenity prohibition
is tied to the Supreme Court's decision on obscenity in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
There, the Court announced
that works that appeal to the prurient interests of the average person,
depict in a patently offensive manner sexual organs or acts, and lack

serious literary, artistic, political or
scientific value enjoy no First Amendment protection.
Similarly, child pornography
can be congressionally excluded from
NEA grant awards, since it is constitutionally proscribed in Ferber v.
New York, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
Somewhat less clear is what
funding constraints can be imposed
on art that is generally considered
to be "indecent."
In most instances, indecent expression (that which does not conform with accepted standards of
morality) escapes government condemnation out of an abiding deference to the First Amendment.
Where, however, the vulgar
utterances are used in a public
forum-on radio or television, for
example-during hours when young
children are likely to be in the
audience, the privilege would be
decidedly less.
While it would appear to be
constitutionally imprudent for Congress to impose restrictions on the
subsidizing of indecent art, certainly it could direct the NEA to shy
away from funding art programs
and performances regarded as indecent if they are aimed at, or likely to
reach, youthful audiences.
To suggest such legislative guidance for grant awards by the NEA
threatens neither artistic creativity
nor First Amendment values. The
failure to insist on such constraints
leaves both vulnerable.
•

Block That Agenda
BY RODNEY A. SMOLLA
Much of the recent attack on
the National Endowment for the
Arts proceeds from the premise that
the government may attach any
conditions it pleases on artistic funding, because it is merely engaging in
decisions over how to spend scarce
resources. A refusal to fund art, the
argument goes, is not to censor it.
There may be a constitutional right
to paint an offensive painting, but
no constitutional right to paint it
with public funds.
An analogy is drawn to decisions in other areas of constitutional law, such as abortion, where
the Supreme Court has distinguished
between negative restrictions on the
exercise of a right and affirmative
obligations to fund its exercise.
In the context of arts funding,
this argument is specious. It is
nothing more than an attempt to
resurrect the long-discredited "rightprivilege" distinction- that the artist's receipt of public funds is a mere
"privilege." Under this view the
govemment is in the same position
as any private benefactor.
For over 40 years, however, the
Supreme Court has rejected this
view. In Perry v. Sindermann, 408
U.S. 593 (1972), it held that while
the government may deny benefits
for any number of reasons, decisions
that infringe on constitutionally protected rights-especially free speechare impermissible.
IllUSTRATION BY TIM TEEBKEN

The principle articulated in
Perry is often misunderstood. It
does not mean that government
may never attach any content-based
conditions to the receipt of grant
funds. Evaluations of artistic merit
are inevitable. The real puzzle is
how to determine what contentbased restrictions are to be permitted, and what not.
One should first dispose of a
pet argument of the NEA's detractors, who make much of the fact that
govemment should not be forced to
fund obscene art. But this point is
irrelevant-of course there is no
First Amendment obligation to fund
obscenity, any more than there is a
First Amendment obligation to fund
speech presenting a clear and present danger of violence.
And virtually everyone would
agree that restrictions that violate
equal protection principles-distinctions based on the identity of speakers-cannot be valid.
There is no obligation to create
an NEA at all, but we could never
tolerate an NEA that gave grants to
whites but not blacks, or Catholics
but not Jews, or Democrats but not
Republicans.

An Equality Principle
But the First Amendment has
an equality principle that spins on
its own gyroscope, separate and
distinct from the equal protection
clause, that also forbids discrimination based on the speaker's mes-

sage. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that "viewpoint discrimination'' is unconstitutional, even
when govemment is merely doling
out public funds, and not exercising
direct censorship.
And so the debate has been
honed to a dispute over what is
meant by ''viewpoint discrimination." The dispute is narrow, but
everything hangs on it.
The "conservative" interpretation treats it as akin to the concept
of "purposeful discrimination." Just
as proof of intent is necessary to
support an equal protection claim of
race or sex discrimination, there
:r,nust be proof of intent by officials to
suppress a particular idea in order
to support a First Amendment claim
of viewpoint discrimination.
This view fails to provide adequate protection for freedom of
speech, however, because it does not
ferret out surreptitious and subtle
forms of discrimination. The better
interpretation puts the onus on the
govemment to justify any contentbased classification.
Because we should constantly
fear viewpoint discrimination masquerading as neutrality, contentbased regulation of speech should
be regarded as presumptively suspect. We should be particularly suspicious when political bodies attempt to micro-manage speech decisions that have traditionally been
left to the sound discretion of profes•
sionals in the field.
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